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The year 1988 was a mixed one for
Pacific Island regionalism, which faced
a rapidly changing economic and polit-
ical environment. The response to the
year's internal and external challenges
was something short of convincing.
Within the region, progress was made
on the critical issue of peace in New
Caledonia and on the previously con-
tentious issue of us tuna fishing. On
the other hand, Fiji remained troubled,
and the level of regional consensus,
arguably, showed signs of erosion.
One of the major factors accounting
for the ambivalence of the regional
attempt to cope collectively with new
demands was the growing impact of
extraregional pressures, particularly
from the greater Asia-Pacific area. Pre-
viously of relatively minor interest to
the rest of the world, the Pacific Islands
have recently begun to feel the effects
of such important developments as the
Japanese economic "miracle," China's
integration into the global economy,
the emergence of ASEAN as an impor-
tant Pacific actor, the Soviet Union's
claim to be a Pacific power, and the
geostrategic uncertainties surrounding
the Philippines.
The changing regional and extrare-
gional environment during 1988 put as
much pressure on the method of Pacific
regionalism as on its s~bstance. The
reforms of the mechanisms of regional
cooperation initiated during the year
were probably more significant than
the substantive issues treated. Three
principal themes-regional organiza-
tion, subregionalism, and extrare-
gional interests-will be discussed in
turn.
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION
Over the last decade, an enormous
amount of time, effort, and money
have gone into attempting to satisfy a
keen desire on the part of some island
leaders for a single regional organiza-
tion. However, the practical impedi-
ments to establishing such an organiza-
tion have been substantial (Herr 1980)
and, at the eighteenth meeting of the
South Pacific Forum in Apia in May
1987, the chimera was put aside in
favor of a coordinated, multiorganiza-
tional approach to regional coopera-
tion. The newly formed Committee on
Regional Institutional Arrangements
(CRIA) was given responsibility for
designing mechanisms to integrate the
activities of the region's four intergov-
ernmental agencies, as well as institu-
tions such as the University of the
South Pacific.
Significantly, solving the conun-
drum of a single regional organization
was not the committee's primary task.
Rather it was to create a means by
which nonregional actors "willing to be
constructively engaged" could interact
with the Forum, "the paramount
regional body" (sPc 1988). The com-
mittee's mandate marked a watershed
in attitudes toward regional organiza-
tion at two levels. It explicitly ack-
nowledged the increasingly complex
regional environment created by the
growing involvement of extraregional
actors. And it admitted implicitly that
the Forum's informal status has created
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some diplomatic problems for member
governments. Despite its unquestiona-
ble political paramountcy, the Forum's
lack of a legal personality prevents it
from achieving some corporate objec-
tives, even with the South Pacific
Bureau for Economic Cooperation
(SPEC) acting as its secretariat.
The CRIA proposals, endorsed by
the nineteenth meeting of the South
Pacific Forum (at Nuku'alofa, 20-21
September 1988), will serve more to lift
the Forum's political profile than to
overcome its structural limitations.
Borrowing an ASEAN concept, CRIA
proposed that "governments and
organisations which have demonstrat-
ed a serious and sustained interest in
the region" be invited to become "dia-
logue partners," and to participate in
discussions immediately following
Forum meetings (sPc 1988). Dialogue
partners would not have observer sta-
tus at the Forum, but the privileged
access and prospects of closer political
ties with member states would none-
theless be valued by the states and
agencies invited to participate. The
dialogue partnership will be inaugu-
rated at the 1989 Forum in Kiribati.
The CRIA arrangements have
strengthened the structure of the
Forum somewhat by renaming SPEC the
"Forum Secretariat," a change intended
to ensure its acceptance as the Forum's
executive agency. The secretariat func-
tion was added some three years after
the organization was established and
has tended to be overshadowed by the
original mandate to promote economic
cooperation. The change may prove
more than cosmetic, particularly if the
political aspect of the new Forum Sec-
retariat is adequately distinguished
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from its economic duties. A major fac-
tor here may be a corporate plan sub-
mitted to SPEC by E. K. Fisk, Tony
Hughes, and Savenaca Siwatibau in
June 1988. The plan was sought by
SPEC Director Henry Naisali, who was
reappointed in 1988 for a further three-
year term, to provide advice "on what
sort of role we should play in future in
view of the fact we want the Forum to
be the paramount decision-making
meeting of the region" (Islands Busi-
ness, April 1988). The consultants
identified a need for more staff,
although the early evidence suggested
that new recruits would be put to work
on development rather than executive
activities (SSD, 24 June 1988).
A third element of the CRIA proposal
endorsed by the 1988 Forum concerned
the hoary issue of a single regional
organizatipn. A new, more formal,
mechanism would replace the annual
consultation between agency heads
that has been used to promote institu-
tional cooperation for a decade. Per-
haps in response to South Pacific Com-
mission sensitivities, the name of the
proposed body was changed from the
Forum Agency Coordinating Commit-
tee to the South Pacific Organisations
Coordinating Committee (spocc).
However, the exact nature of spocc's
powers were unclear, and the question
of the commission's participation in it
was referred by the twenty-eighth
South Pacific Conference to the 1989
meeting of the Committee of Represen-
tatives of Governments and Adminis-
trations (CRGA) for further consider-
ation (SPC 1988). Given its involvement
in established annual consultations, the
commission is likely to participate in
spocc, in which case it will be involved
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with the new institutional arrange-
ments both through spocc and as a
designated dialogue partner.
The restructuring of the procedures
for regional cooperation was the key
long-term organizational issue for
1988. But the Forum also took steps to
enhance its influence as a regional
actor in other areas. Having negotiated
a regional fisheries agreement with the
United States in 1987, the Forum Fish-
eries Agency sought a similar conces-
sion from Japan and, when Tokyo
resisted, turned to the South Pacific
Forum for support. The Forum's 1988
meeting backed the Forum Fisheries
Agency with a strongly worded para-
graph in its formal communique that
named Japan, and expressed the "high
priority" it attached to "improved mul-
tilateral fisheries arrangements." The
meeting also resolved to explore means
of becoming more involved in the
Pacific Economic Cooperation Confer-
ence (PECC) to be hosted by New
Zealand in 1989. Recognizing its
"increasingly complex" regional secu-
rity environment, the 1988 Forum
endorsed a proposal by its recently
formed Committee on Regional Secu-
rity Information Exchange "to estab-
lish a system for an enhanced and
timely exchange of information among
Forum members on a wide range of
issues affecting their political and eco-
nomic security" (ADFAT 1988).
All of the South Pacific's intergov-
ernmental organizations are affected
by the CRIA proposals, but none more
so than the South Pacific Commission.
The dialogue partners' arrangement is
expected to undercut to some extent
the special affection for the commis-
sion held by Britain, France, and the
United States, who helped establish the
organization more than forty years
ago. This change will be accentuated in
the longer run should the dialogue rela-
tionship provide genuine political
access to the Forum. An effective
spocc will secure some of the long-
cherished aims of single regional
organization supporters to achieve aid
coordination, and this will cut across
the commission's other major strength
-the geographically comprehensive
South/Pacific Conference. Understand-
ably, the October 1988 meeting of the
South Pacific Conference at Rarotonga
reacted cautiously to the CRIA propos-
als. However, the 1988 Conference
may not have represented a true test of
regional opinion since much of its time
had to be devoted to an internal house-
keeping matter. Lamentably, a contro-
versy over the commission's finances
combined with personal matters to
force the early retirement of Palauni
Tuiasosopo, the energetic secretary-
general from American Samoa.
Indicative of the more active interest
that it has taken in regional affairs over
the past few years, France sought mem-
bership of the Coordinating Commit-
tee on Offshore Prospecting/South
Pacific (ccOP/SOPAC) during 1988
(SSD, 14 Oct 1988). Although the
French request was denied on the
grounds that membership is restricted
to Forum members, not all expressions
of extraregional interest were rejected.
The Soviet Union, which had been
excluded from the 1987 meeting, was
again invited to participate in the Tech-
nical Advisory Group that assisted the
work of the seventeenth session of
CCOP/SOPAC held in Suva from 13-22
October 1988. The Soviet offer of mul-
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tilateral assistance to CCOP/SOPAC
members was declined, but there was
some indication that a series of bilat-
eral offers outside the CCOP/SOPAC
framework might be accepted (SSD,
28 Oct 1988).
In other areas of maritime regional
cooperation the news was very good
for the Pacific Islands during 1988.
Reports early in the year suggested that
the Pacific Forum Line would suffer
losses, in part because of traffic down-
turns following the 1987 military coups
in Fiji. But, in the event, the shipping
line returned a profit in 1988 (SSD, 14
Oct 1988). Resolution of the dispute
with the United States in 1987 was a
spectacular success for the Forum
Fisheries Agency, and much of 1988
was spent preparing for, or reaping,
the rewards of this success. The United
States deposited its instrument of ratifi-
cation for the South Pacific Regional
Fisheries Treaty in Port Moresby on 15
June 1988 and made the first payments
in a package worth $50 million over the
next five years (Keith-Reid 1988a, 26).
SUBREGIONALISM
Despite the recognition that increasing
external pressures have put on collec-
tive regional action, a major step
toward the creation of bloc politics
within Pacific Island regionalism was
taken during 1988. Papua New Guinea,
the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu
signed an accord on 14 March 1988 in
Port Vila to formalize an association
formed more than two years earlier as
the Melanesian Spearhead group. This
was not the first expression of Melane-
sian subregionalism, nor the first
attempt to formalize a subregional
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grouping. Proposals for a Melanesian
federation have circulated since the
1950S, and the creation of the Nauru
Group within the Forum Fisheries
Agency in 1982 provided a precedent
for formal subregionalism. Neverthe-
less, the formation of the Melanesian
Spearhead group does appear to be a
concerted effort to pursue Melanesian
solidarity and foreign policy aims in a
more disciplined fashion than ever
before.
The catalyst for the Vila declaration
appears to have been the tense situa-
tion in New Caledonia, although some
observers speculated that the explicit
Melanesian nationalism of the coups in
Fiji was also a factor (Loudon I988, 4).
Cultural commonality figured promi-
nently in the principles espoused by the
three prime ministers who signed the
agreement (which they refused to call a
treaty): Paias Wingti of Papua New
Guinea, Ezekiel Alebua of the Solo-
mons, and Walter Lini of Vanuatu.
The nine declared principles were long
on sentiment but short on substance.
Almost as if drafted by a greeting-card
writer, the first letters of each state-
ment combined to spell out the word
MELANESIA, and commitments to tradi-
tional values, national independence,
and the reduction of international ten-
sions were proclaimed.
The three prime ministers were sen-
sitive to the charge that the spearhead
might undermine Pacific regionalism,
in part because the Melanesian states
had long been in the vanguard of the
push for a single regional organization.
They emphasized their support for the
South Pacific Forum "as the paramount
regional organisation" (Mercury, 15
March 1988). Yet even before the Vila
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declaration was drafted, skepticism
was expressed about the implications
of the spearhead. The more conserva-
tive states of Polynesia have viewed
Melanesian solidarity with some suspi-
cion from the early 1970s. Since the
size, population, and resources of the
Melanesian states give them a potential
weight that the Polynesian states,
although more numerous, cannot
match, a Polynesian backlash was to be
expected when the spearhead group
began to take shape.
Statements by King Taufa'ahau
Tupou IV of Tonga early in 1988 drew
attention to an initiative by French
Polynesia and the Cook Islands to pro-
mote Polynesian cooperation under the
banner of the "Polynesian Community"
(Keith-Reid 1988b, 8). Like the Mela-
nesian Spearhead, the Polynesian Com-
munity was to be grounded in cultural
affinity. Unlike the spearhead, how-
ever, the Polynesian grouping was not
intended to have a political function, a
decision that was probably necessitated
by a membership that would include
dependencies such as the Tokelaus,
French Polynesia, and American
Samoa, as well as communities such as
the Maoris and the Hawaiians (Lomas
1988,10). The most important differ-
ence between the two subregional asso-
ciations may turn out to be their capac-
ity for collective action. The spearhead
countries were sufficiently cohesive to
ensure that the spearhead did material-
ize during 1988, but the Polynesian
group has yet to be finalized. It appears
that the political reverses of French
Polynesia's Gaullist strongman, Gaston
Flosse, during 1988 had much to do
with the loss of impetus for pursuing
the Polynesian Community concept.
The moves toward more structured
and coherent subregional bloc politics
are potentially important but did not
prove critical during 1988. Circum-
stances that might have provoked a
major confrontation, such as the ongo-
ing crisis in New Caledonia, eased.
The political eclipse of the powerful
but erratic Barak Sope in Vanuatu dur-
ing the second half of 1988, and the
mid-year change of government in
Papua New Guinea, also tended to ele-
vate domestic concerns over foreign
policy issues within the spearhead
nations. Nonetheless, the sentiments
that motivated the formation of the
two blocs are likely to lead to longer-
term foreign policy cleavages. Attach-
ment to Western geostrategic assess-
ments is clearly an important element
in the Polynesian perception of the
need for unity. Yet these attachments
are increasingly coming under chal-
lengeas a wider range of nontradi-
tional actors seeks influence in the
region, and the spearhead countries are
still likely to be more supportive of a
broader range of diplomatic contacts.
EXTRAREGIONAL INTERESTS
Observers agree that regional politics
have become vastly more intricate in
recent years, but there is less agreement
on the rationale for this broadening
involvement. The interest of the Soviet
Union has been a highly visible case in
point. Where critics have seen a covert
and sinister military ambition behind
Moscow's fishing deals in the region,
others have found only an overt and
benign commercial interest. Multiple
objectives motivate the increased con-
cern of most extraregional states with
W!j\'UiSW4¥8!t4§l@I§8W.'WRffih'SW,lidi,.*W.Wg;i6i\@UW 1M &¥hJlliMliZi&ii1
POLITICAL REVIEW. THE REGION
the Pacific Islands. Nevertheless,
changes outside the region have con-
tributed more than changes inside to
the increased international prominence
of the islands. Heightened diplomatic
activity in the region may be more eas-
ily explained by instrumental interests
than interest in the islands themselves.
japan may appear to be an excep-
tion since it has steadily expanded its
role in the Pacific for more than two
decades, largely on the basis of a trad-
ing relationship. But Tokyo's diplo-
matic reticence changed dramatically
in january 1987, when then Foreign
Minister TadashiKuranari announced
that japan would significantly expand
its political presence in the islands. The
"Kuranari Doctrine" was not prompted
by intrinsic commercial interests. Insta-
bility in the post-Marcos Philippines,
Soviet access to base facilities in Viet-
nam, and Moscow's fisheries agree-
ments with Kiribati and Vanuatu all
helped to convince Tokyo of the vul-
nerability of its southern approaches,
and the need to pay more direct atten-
tion to the islands.
However, japan's newly claimed
political responsibilities have not won
universal acceptance, and a perception
that the Kuranari Doctrine would be
more difficult to implement than was
first expected emerged during 1988.
A report by a Tokyo University inter-
national relations specialist, Akio
Watanabe, offered trenchant criticism
of the new policy's main instruments-
technical assistance and financial aid
(Goodall 1988, 28). japanese aid was
criticized as misdirected, inappro-
priate, and, in many cases, self-serving.
Watanabe's report has been adopted by
Dr Saburo Okita, himself a former for-
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eign minister and now a chief adviser
to the Foreign Affairs Ministry, as the
basis for refurbishing the japanese
image in the islands (Goodall 1988).
Significantly, in light of the japanese
stance toward the Forum Fisheries
Agency's demand for a regional access
treaty, the Watanabe Report seems
likely to buttress movement toward a
more regional emphasis in aid-giving.
japan's review of its foreign rela-
tions with Pacific entities during 1988
was prompted not only by a perception
that its southern sea lanes had become
more vulnerable, but also by a belief
that the traditional guarantors of secu-
rity in this part of the world had be-
come less reliable. Despite renewal of
the Philippines bases agreement in
October 1988, Washington clearly
needed help on the Asian littoral, help
the Reagan administration sought from
japan under the guise of "burden-shar-
ing." japan's view of the Australian and
New Zealand effort in the islands also
appeared to become more sanguine
following the military coups in Fiji
(Goodall 1988, 28). Concern for the
indigenous commitment to introduced
democratic structures may have been
an immediate catalyst for the more
overt japanese influence that Okita
proposed, but this was probably not
the primary motivation for the new
policy directions of 1988. Anxiety over
the ANZUS treaty, and in particular the
Soviet Union's moves to detach Austra-
lia from its close security relationship
with the United States, was almost cer-
tainly the ultimate consideration.
On the face of it, and despite some
recorded gains, 1988 was not a banner
year for the Soviet Union in its rela-
tions with the Pacific Islands. Early in
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the year, the much-criticized fishing
agreement with Vanuatu lapsed after
only one year of operation (as had the
even more controversial first agree-
ment with Kiribati the year before).
The Soviet fishing fleet was said to
have been equally, if not more, unsuc-
cessful in the waters around Vanuatu
than it had been in those of Kiribati.
Despite its embarrassment, however,
the Soviet Ministry for Fisheries per-
sisted in attempts to reach a new agree-
ment with Vanuatu. By the end of 1988
these attempts appeared to have been
successful, although the terms of the
new agreement were not public at the
time of writing. The one evident break-
through for Moscow was the decision
of the new government of Rabbie
Namaliu to permit the building of a
resident mission in Papua New Guinea
(SSD, 2 Sept 1988). Ironically, Foreign
Minister Michael Somare, within
whose portfolio the issue rested, had
opposed similar Soviet requests during
his earlier terms as prime minister. The
PNG move, which seemed to be part of
a strategy to develop a more indepen-
dent foreign policy, surprised external
observers, and upset some within the
country. A temporary delay was forced
by the national Parliament, which
reportedly wanted to be satisfied that
Moscow had "a genuine desire for rela-
tions which would benefit PNG" (SSD,
16 Sept 1988).
Suspicions that a security objective
lay behind Soviet interest in the islands
were reinforced in some quarters dur-
ing the year. The Soviet Union linked
the us-Australian joint facilities to pos-
sible future global security negotia-
tions, and in September 1988, Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev proposed
that the Soviet Union would relinquish
access to Cam Ranh and Da Nang in
Vietnam if the United States recipro-
cated with its Philippine bases. Both
were seen by some defense planners as,
among other things, attempting to
reduce the Australian commitment to
ANZUS. Undermining the Western
alignment of the islands would contrib-
ute to the pressure on Australia, the
one country in the region that is recog-
nized as vital to the global defense pos-
ture of the United States. Even more
benign interpretations of Soviet activi-
ties underscored the extent of geopo-
litical change in the Asia-Pacific area,
which has set in train a chain reaction
of adjustments among all international
actors with interests in, or abutting,
the islands.
Gorbachev's program of perestroika
(economic and social restructuring) has
provided an alternative explanation for
the Soviets' special interest in the Pa-
cific over the past three years. Gorba-
chev has set the Soviet Union on a
course of joining the movement toward
regional economic cooperation under
the auspices of the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference (PECC), re-
garded by his predecessors as an anti-
Soviet economic bloc. Although still
denied formal membership in the five-
country association, the Soviets quick-
ly sought to develop the observer status
granted in 1988 (Barber 1988). PECC
will meet in New Zealand late in 1989
and necessarily the Soviets' desire for
genuine participation in Asia-Pacific
economic integration will be joined
with New Zealand's efforts to involve
the islands more fully in PECC activi-
ties.
As noted earlier, the United States
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took a vital step toward repairing its
relations with the region by concluding
the multilateral fisheries access agree-
ment in 1987. However, except for the
implementation of this treaty (includ-
ing the passing of supportive legisla-
tion), the emphasis was on bilateral
diplomacy in 1988. Most notably, the
satellite mission in Honiara was up-
graded to full embassy status, and a
resident mission in Western Samoa was
opened. The on-again, off-again com-
pact of free association with Belau,
including the apparent suicide of Presi-
dent Lazarus Salii in August 1988, was
the most obvious bilateral debit.
Although the major extraregional
changes affecting the Pacific Islands
were generated by processes indepen-
dent of them, some changes were
sparked by developments within the
area. Regional hegemons Australia and
New Zealand were concerned primar-
ily with events in New Caledonia,
Vanuatu, and especially, Fiji during
1988. The military coups and the sub-
sequent cuts in aid had alienated Aus-
tralia and New Zealand from Fiji in
1987, and Rabuka's new quasi-civilian
regime devoted some effort during 1988
to developing alternative diplomatic
contacts. Asia was the focus of this
search. Closer links were forged with
Taiwan, to the annoyance of Beijing,
and with Malaysia, a country which,
because of its ethnic tensions, has
much in common with contemporary
Fiji. France wasted little time in
exploiting the political embarrassment
of Australia and New Zealand in Fiji
and continued to expand its aid pro-
gram there. Meanwhile, Australia's
Pacific Patrol Boat scheme continued in
1988, with the Solomons and Western
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Samoa receiving their first boats and
Papua New Guinea its third.
One extraregional development
that was exposed during 1988 could
threaten the very existence of the
smaller islands of the region and owes
nothing to political maneuvering. The
"greenhouse effect" of the earth's pol-
luted atmosphere puts the region's low-
lying atolls in danger of inundation as
rising temperatures melt the polar ice-
caps and raise sea levels around the
globe. The Nuku'alofa meeting of the
Forum discussed the issue, but could
do little except endorse an Australian
proposal to assess the value of setting
up a network of climatic monitors
across the region (Fraser 1988, 24).
Should the "greenhouse effect" prove
genuine, this extraregional intrusion
may well menace the region more fun-
damentally than the political machina-
tions that dominated the headlines
throughout 1988.
RICHARD A. HERR
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Melanesia in Review:
Issues and Events, 1988
FIJI
The dominating feature of I988 for Fiji
was its attempt to come to terms with
the consequences of the preceding
year's two military coups. While many
claimed the country had now changed
irrevocably through the installation of
de facto military rule, the Rabuka-
dominated order, with Ratu Sir Penaia
Ganilau as President and Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara continuing as Prime
Minister in an interim government,
accorded urgency to persuading pub-
lics at home and abroad that Fiji was
returning to normal. For the Austra-
lian, New Zealand, United States, Brit-
ish, and neighboring South Pacific gov-
ernments, there was a predisposition to
take the regime at its word about its
intentions. For the Mara government,
the major objectives on the road to
acceptability included acquisition of
legitimacy via constitutional change,
economic recovery through incentives
and enlistment of foreign interests,
and, not least, keeping a firm local lid
on a potentially volatile mix of social,
political, and ethnic conflict.
The proposed constitutional refor-
mulation, in particular intentions .
about parliamentary representation,
saw details drip fed through a series of
far from consistent statements.
Through a major address to the nation
in March, Ratu Sir Kamisese said that
it was the intention of his interim
administration to "hold free and open
elections once a broadly acceptable
constitution was completed." Never-
theless this would "have to ensure the
full protection of the fundamental
interests and concerns of the indige-
nous Fijian people, but at the same
time accommodate on a fair and equi-
table basis the position of other com-
munities" (PIM, May 1988 , 37).
Yet in July, when details for such a
single chamber parliament comprising
71 seats were announced; such princi-
ples of equity were hardly in evidence.
Indians would elect 22 representatives
from a communal roll; Fijians would
have 28 representatives although, inter-
